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Professor William E. Nelson’s book, Fighting for the City: A History of the New
York City Corporation Counsel, offers an insightful and full-blooded history of the
New York City Law Department and of the people who served as the city’s chief
lawyer, the Corporation Counsel. Readers of Professor Nelson’s book, particularly
those who actively participated in the work of the Law Department over the last
forty years may be surprised by his treatment. Many anticipated a recitation of
litigations won and lost and a catalog of mostly laudatory events, as is often typical of
commissioned histories. Professor Nelson’s book does not follow that pattern. It is a
thorough history, academically grounded, and deals with many of the major questions
that arose as part of the professional duties of the Corporation Counsel and the
lawyers who worked at the Law Department. Most importantly, Professor Nelson
offers an analysis and standard for making judgments as to the Corporation Counsel’s
success or lack of success. This standard involves how well the Corporation Counsel
defined the mission of the office of Corporation Counsel during his tenure, and how
successfully the occupant of that office fulfilled that mission. In developing his
analytical framework, Professor Nelson makes a significant contribution to the
literature about New York City and about government lawyers generally. Not
everyone is or will be happy with the judgments offered by Professor Nelson. Indeed,
his book has engendered adverse comment from a significant number of readers,
some of whose detailed attacks are included in the articles in this issue of the Law
Review.1 The specific criticism set out by these writers mostly concerns one era—the
period following World War II when the Law Department supported the firing of
city employees who were members of the Communist Party or were suspected of
being members or sympathizers of the party. The critics, challenging the factual
basis underlying Professor Nelson’s interpretation of the period, attack his association
of the firings with the Catholic Church and its political, religious, and international
concerns.
The involvement of the Catholic Church in New York City politics during the
post-World War II period may be debatable, but that debate does not undermine the
conceptual bases underlying Professor Nelson’s analysis of that period and, indeed,
his entire book. Professor Nelson, in his introduction, makes clear that two
competing and overarching realities deeply affected the Corporation Counsel and
the Law Department throughout its three-hundred year history.
The first was New York City’s economic strength relative to other cities in the
nation and in the world. New York City is many things, but one thing it consistently
has been is an economic player. Like any economic player, the resources available to
the city greatly determined policies and outcomes. Professor Nelson characterizes
the economic factors that governed New York City as polar opposites: competition
versus monopoly. For part of its history, Professor Nelson states, New York City
struggled against other strong, competing cities: Philadelphia in the colonial era, for
example, and international world cities in our own era. During other periods New
York City benefited from near monopoly power, as when the Erie Canal opened and
New York City overcame Philadelphia as the nation’s leading port, and, later, when
1.

See, e.g., Paul A. Crotty, A Response: Why William Nelson’s Analysis of the Law Department 1946–1965 is
Wrong, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 519 (2009).
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New York City’s wealth allowed it to come close to monopolizing the nation’s capital
markets.
The different eras where either competition or monopoly was in the ascendancy
directly relate to the second major theme of Professor Nelson’s book: distributive
justice versus efficiency. By distributive justice, Professor Nelson emphasizes a
democratic conception of justice, meaning that the law be administered in the interest
of a majority of the people, or at least the interests identified by the elected officials
chosen by a majority of the electorate. For the Corporation Counsel, a concern for
distributive justice often warranted the Law Department’s hiring of attorneys who
were members of large, ethnic voting blocks, such as the Irish immigrant classes. It
also, at other times, justified the Law Department’s pursuit of affirmative litigation
designed to advantage a majority of voters favored for one reason or another.
Efficiency, on the other hand, involves maximizing the well-being of the lawyer’s
client. With a client like the city of New York, this meant attention to both the
fiscal health of the city and its residents, as well as a faithful devotion to the legal
order on which the city and its residents depended. Examples of legal policies based
on efficiency include the city’s strict enforcement during the colonial period of the
economic terms under which the city had leased its valuable waterfront land, 2 or the
Law Department’s vigorous defense of the public treasury against excessively
expensive service demands, whether those demands emanated from well-heeled real
estate developers or indigent welfare recipients.3
Professor Nelson uses these concepts to develop standards by which to measure
how each Corporation Counsel approached his job and to make judgments about
that Corporation Counsel’s choices and successes. In so doing, Professor Nelson
takes on one of the most difficult question that confounds every governmental
lawyer: who is the client? Lawyers, even Corporation Counsels, are not free actors
able to accept or reject policies according to their own agendas. They have clients.
But just who is that client? To whom does the Corporation Counsel owe his
professional loyalty: The mayor who appointed the Corporation Counsel? The entity
known as the “Corporation of the City of New York”? Or the people making up the
population of the city? Such a debate becomes particularly complex in New York
City with its eight million residents, perhaps another three million or more who
work in the city but live elsewhere, and a multiplicity of municipal agencies that
provide every conceivable service, from intensive hospital stays and home care, to
paving interstate highways and educating students from pre-K to Ph.D. status.
Professor Nelson acknowledges that his conceptual polar opposites are never
perfectly fulfilled.4 Nevertheless, he states that
[w]hatever [their] complexities . . . it seems clear that every Corporation
Counsel has had two intertwined but separate roles—as lawyer for the
2.

William E. Nelson, Fighting for the City: A History of the New York City Corporation
Counsel 19–20 (2008).

3.

See id. at 264–67.

4.

See id. at xii.
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government of New York City and as advisor to the Mayor or other democratic
master who placed him in office; and every Corporation Counsel has had to
determine how much emphasis to give each role.5

Professor Nelson’s book is thus a history with a thesis; it is that thesis that holds
the narrative together as he moves through three hundred years of Law Department
history. Professor Nelson returns repeatedly to this thesis as a way of making sense
of the choices made by individual Corporation Counsels and as a way to judge the
adequacy and success of the leadership provided by that person. It is that consistency
of Professor Nelson’s analytical construct, and the flare with which he uses it, that
makes Fighting for the City such an interesting and stimulating book.
* * * * *
The heart of Professor Nelson’s book is a chronological discussion of the
functioning of the Corporation Counsel and of the Law Department during ten
different periods. During the first era discussed, 1686 –1801,6 the legal business of
the city of New York was performed by an official bearing the ancient English title
of “recorder.” The recorder, generally a member of the colonial elite, had two main
duties. He was a judge of the leading court, the mayor’s court, where he was most
likely to be the judge most conversant with the law. At the same time, the recorder
was the legal advisor to the city’s legislative body, the common council, where he
drafted ordinances, advised on the legalities of proposed actions, and interpreted
English law. He occasionally also represented the city in litigation.
Although legal records and biographies are scant for some recorders, others are
well known. David Horsmanden, who served as recorder from 1735 through 1747,
was, like most of the others, tied tightly to the governing elite. Horsmanden
simultaneously held high-level appointments in the city, its courts, and in the
governor’s council. It was Horsmanden who was in office during the Slave Rebellion
of 1741. The Slave Rebellion related to a series of fires, thought to be arson, that
threatened the physical survival of the city. Recorder Horsmanden supported
following full English criminal procedures in the prosecution of the alleged rebels.
He also supported stiff punishment for those convicted: burning at the stake and
hanging. Professor Nelson cites Horsmanden as an example of a recorder whose
awesomeness provided the power to enforce law in a colony that lacked today’s police
powers with which to enforce regulations and ordinances.7
With the city in competition with other ports, the recorders of the period
relentlessly protected the city’s ownership of and rights to its valuable land holdings
by drafting and enforcing leases that encouraged economically important development.
This need brought to the office men who possessed strong transactional and political

5.

Id.

6.

See id. at 1–28.

7.

For Professor Nelson’s discussion of Horsmanden, see Nelson, supra note 2, at 6–12.
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skills needed to build the economy of the growing city. One such man was Richard
Varick, who served as recorder from 1784 through 1789, and later became mayor.8
Varick was one of the judges who decided the case Rutgers v. Waddington, a case
that protected property and encouraged business. 9 The case involved a claim for rent
and ownership of real property that had been abandoned by the owner when the
British occupied New York City during the Revolutionary War. The owner returned
when the British departed, and demanded recovery of the property and rents from
the people who had used the property under British authority during the occupation.
The court’s decision resulted in a compromise that gave rents to the returning owner,
but only for the period after the British had left. In doing so, it upheld the commercial
law of nations which protected individuals acting under the command of occupying
military force. The decision in Rutgers v. Waddington, in Professor Nelson’s view,
“reflected the internationalist views of the city’s emerging mercantile elite, who were
relying on the law of nations in an effort to rebuild economic ties with Britain and
without whose cooperation and assistance the mayor, recorder, and Council could
not govern the city.” 10
Professor Nelson summarized the qualities of the recorder at the beginning of
the nineteenth century as fitting more with the competitive/efficiency side of his
comparisons, stating that
[b]y the end of the eighteenth century, . . . mental acumen and legal
knowledge, together with hard work, were the most important traits a man
needed to become Recorder and counsel for the City of New York. By 1800,
the office had shed the profile built on inspiring awe that it had inherited
from the Middle Ages. It also had begun to assume a modern style of
professionalism that remains one of the leading characteristics of the Law
Department today. But a key competing characteristic—a democratic
obligation to heed the voice of the people—had only begun to emerge.11

The period from 1801 through 1875 was a period of growth for the city and
democratization of the government.12 After the opening of the Erie Canal, New
York City emerged as the strongest economic competitor among the nation’s ports.
Professor Nelson states that the city’s “oscillation between corruption and reform
during” the period after 1850 “reflected a distributional contest over who would

8.

Id. at 16.

9.

See id. at 23 (discussing Rutgers v. Waddington, an unpublished 1784 mayor’s court decision). For the
opinion and documents associated with the case, see 1 The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton:
Documents and Commentary 282–419 (Julius Goebel, Jr., ed., 1964); Select Cases of the
Mayor’s Court of New York City, 1674–1784, 57–59, at 302–07 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1935); see
also Nelson, supra note 2, at 23 n.49.

10. Nelson, supra note 2, at 27.
11.

Id. at 27–28.

12. See id. at 29–63.
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retain the monopoly profits that the city’s commerce generated—the merchants, the
politicians, or the common voters.”13
Growth fueled demand for professionalism in the office of Corporation Counsel,
while democracy tended to politicize the office. The last recorder of the eighteenth
century, feeling the pressure of increased demand for legal services, began to hire
assistants, which led to political considerations in their appointments. Both the
common council and the state legislature during this period were involved in the
evolution of the office, with the common council in 1812 reconstituting the position
and making the recorder dependent on it. Later, the state legislature in 1849 made
the Corporation Counsel an elected position as part of a new charter for the city of
New York.
This was also the period of the growth of Tammany Hall with its popular
mandate and legacy of corruption. Corporation Counsel Lorenzo B. Shephard, a
reformer, and an elected Corporation Counsel from 1855 to 1856, fought with Mayor
Fernando Wood, a regular Tammany Democrat, over management of the construction
of Central Park. Mayor Wood sought to build a Central Park that was more of a
playland rather than the verdant green ward sought by the elite. Professor Nelson
characterized Shephard as the first Corporation Counsel who proclaimed that his
client was the city as an entity, not the particular elected official whom the majority
had placed in office.14
During the period of the Tweed Ring,15 Richard O’Gorman was Corporation
Counsel. O’Gorman had been nominated by Tammany Hall in 1865 when Tammany
sensed that the mood of the electorate called for a reformer of stature, a Corporation
Counsel who would maintain some independence. O’Gorman proved to be capable,
and managed to navigate between the reformers and the Tweed Ring during his
tenure. He was not tarred with the corruption scandal that brought down the Ring
in 1871.16
Professor Nelson observed that by the 1870s, it was generally understood that
the city required a strong Corporation Counsel, like O’Gorman, who was nonetheless
nourished by politics. The Corporation Counsel, Professor Nelson writes,
needed a political base, either his own or the Mayor’s, to which he could turn
to ingest the power that the office itself did not possess, to impose the law on
recalcitrant officials, and to force them to act on behalf of the city rather than
the political forces that had elected them. Corporation Counsels who lacked

13. Id. at 41.
14.

Id. at 43.

15.

William Tweed, through his leadership of the Tammany Hall Democrats, controlled the political life of
New York City following the Civil War until his overthrow in 1871. Tweed held many appointed and
elected offices, but was never mayor. He was ultimately convicted of looting the city treasury and died
in a New York City jail in 1878. For a sweeping and readable history of Boss Tweed, see Kenneth D.
Ackerman, Boss Tweed: The Rise and Fall of the Corrupt Pol Who Conceived the Soul of
Modern New York (2005).

16. Nelson, supra note 2, at 60–62.
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such a power base were ineffective and, when their power was drained away
by corruption, even worse.17

Between 1875 and 1898,18 the Corporation Counsel was modernized, and a
recognizable Law Department was established under the leadership of William C.
Whitney, Corporation Counsel from 1875 to 1882. This was a period where control
seesawed between reformers and Tammany Hall, and where the competition for the
distribution of the city’s resources continued.
Whitney came into office following the Tweed Ring scandals. He introduced
non-political hiring as well as the retention of seasoned attorneys who performed at
a high-level of professionalism. His particular innovation was to hire young attorneys
from prestigious law schools, much in the manner that large law firms today recruit
associates. This innovation actually preceded the development of a similar hiring
scheme established at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, which has been generally
credited with starting the now widely-copied hiring practice.19 Whitney, like other
Corporation Counsels, also acted with deference to the city’s majority when he
resisted state-sponsored legislation aimed at protecting Sunday from liquor and
gambling. He, for example, directed the police to make no arrests in absence of a
warrant issued by a magistrate.20
Professor Nelson emphasized that Whitney’s legacy was the creation and
maintenance of a bureaucratic Law Department that protected the city’s fiscal wellbeing and facilitated the delivery of public services far better than the ad hoc
structures of the mid-nineteenth century political establishment. Even after
Tammany Hall had regained city hall in 1888, the Corporation Counsel was able to
hold onto the reforms that were needed to provide the legal work necessary to build
the infrastructure of the modern city.21
The period following the 1898 consolidation of the city lasted until 1917, during
which the political battles between Tammany Hall and reformers continued. The
first mayor after consolidation, Robert A. Van Wyck, brought back a traditional
Tammany Hall outlook, but he was replaced by reformer Seth Low in 1901, and the
Tammany Hall mayors that followed proved to be relatively independent. The result
was that the Law Department was generally able to maintain its professional status
throughout the period. 22
The Law Department of the period, with seventy attorneys, emerged as the
largest law office in the nation. With its hiring practices fluctuating under the
17.

Id. at 62.

18. Id. at 65–93.
19.

See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding,
and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1581, 1628–29
(1998) (referring to Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of
the Large Law Firm 4–5 (1988)).

20. Nelson, supra note 2, at 89.
21.

See id. at 92.

22.

Id. at 95–124.
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different mayors, the Law Department boasted attorneys from both prestigious law
schools and from the ranks of the more recent immigrant groups on which Tammany
Hall depended. Over time, Professor Nelson reports, the Law Department built up
a cadre of professional “attorneys from diverse backgrounds capable of enriching and
improving each other’s work.”23
Professor Nelson observed that during the period from 1898 to 1917 the Law
Department fulfilled its mission of monitoring city officials, supporting construction
of municipal infrastructure, and upholding the city’s tax powers and regulatory
authority. It also continued to reflect the electorate’s democratic desires by restrictively
interpreting unpopular state laws aimed at improving morals. Outside of hiring
staff, which was balanced between civil service and political appointments, the
Corporation Counsel “successfully resisted most of the pressures to which interest
groups were subjecting him.”24
Tammany Hall held city hall between 1918 and 1933 and re-invoked its full
political prerogatives.25 Appointees to the Law Department did not come from the
elite, but from those with less “fancy backgrounds.”26 Professor Nelson does not
disparage the quality of many of these appointees. This was a time when elite law
schools, by their admission policies, discriminated against highly-capable immigrants
or their children. Professor Nelson suggests, however, that Tammany Hall’s use of
appointments to the Law Department was not merely patronage to keep the
Tammany machine well-oiled. It was also a political strategy to populate “the Law
Department with attorneys who valued the central role that ordinary people should
play in formulating government policy and shaping the law.”27 This was a time when
Tammany Hall built its election success by responding to New York City’s immigrant
populations, which had become the majority of the voters.28
The Law Department’s politicized and democratic policies included not only
resistance to Prohibition, but resistance to governmentally imposed restrictions on
other popular social activies as well. One example was a ruling by the Corporation
Counsel regarding playing football on Sunday. While playing baseball on Sunday
was legal under state law, playing football, the Corporation Counsel ruled, was not.
The explanation: professional baseball had gained the loyalty of the city’s immigrant
communities, while football was at that time primarily an Ivy League activity. 29
Other areas where the Corporation Counsel pursued policies or litigation favoring
the city’s population involved the financing of subways, the regulation of transit
fares, and opposition to high rates for gas and electricity.
23.

Id. at 111.

24.

Id. at 124.

25.

Id. at 125–54.

26. Id. at 130–31.
27.

Id. at 151.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 145.
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The end of this period came with the resignation of Mayor James J. Walker in
1932 following the revelations of widespread corruption unearthed by the Seabury
Investigations. The Law Department did not escape being tarred by the scandal,
although Walker’s resignation short-circuited the investigations. Corruption was
nevertheless found to have occurred in the handling and settling of worker
compensation cases and in the monetary awards granted property owners subject to
eminent domain. The Law Department at this time was part of the Tammany Hall
machine and, as Professor Nelson concluded, the Law Department “participated in
at least some and overlooked more of the corrupt practices of that machine.”30
The late 1920s brought another trend to a conclusion. New York City was no
longer dominant economically. The nation’s rail network allowed other cities to
compete with New York City, and the demands for social services, brought on in part
by Tammany Hall’s policies to serve the urban immigrant community, greatly
expanded the costs of government just when the city’s relative capacity to fund those
services had declined. The city was entering a new economic period in which the
Law Department would need to respond more to the demands for efficiency.31
Fiorello LaGuardia, mayor from 1934 to 1945, 32 defeated the Tammany
candidate, and returned the city to a reform administration imbued with a scientific
management style. LaGuardia’s first Corporation Counsel, Paul Windels, cleaned
house, firing sixty-six assistant Corporation Counsels. He replaced them with the
best attorneys he could find regardless of politics. They were, however, heavily
recruited from elite law schools, a pattern that rejected the prior Tammany view that
Law Department attorneys should come from, and be part of, the community. Many
of those recruited during this period performed superbly and remained with the Law
Department for a substantial portion of their careers.33
While the Law Department provided the city with exceptional representation, it
also followed the democratic needs of the mayor, as Professor Nelson shows in his
discussion of the Bertrand Russell matter. Mayor LaGuardia opposed the
appointment of Bertrand Russell as a visiting professor at City College of New York
on moral grounds. Russell had become controversial among many of New York
City’s voters because of his liberal views on marriage and sex. LaGuardia had the
appointment revoked and, when the case reached the court, the Law Department
defended the revocation and won.34 This case and others led Professor Nelson to
conclude that the LaGuardia Law Department “was neither fully professional nor
fully democratic: its staffing policies were professional, but many of its programmatic
policies were democratic.” 35 Professor Nelson characterized the LaGuardia
30. Id. at 137.
31.

See id. at 153.

32.

Id. at 155–82.

33.

See id. at 160–71.

34. See id. at 172–74.
35.

Id. at 182.

549

THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT

administration as one of transition, during which the city had to compete for
resources, while at the same time respond to the democratic demands of a population
that expected much more from government than government could provide.36
Tammany Hall regained and held city hall from 1946 through 1965,37 although
Mayor Robert Wagner broke with Tammany Hall in 1961 when he ran for a third
term. Hiring, though political, nonetheless continued to bring to the Law
Department many outstanding lawyers. Among them was Milton Mollen, who
came to the Law Department after coming to the attention of Denis Hurley,
Corporation Counsel under Mayor Vincent R. Impellitteri.38
Because the period is so recent, for the first time in his book Professor Nelson
begins to have access to people who could give personal accounts of their experiences.
Among the people interviewed were Milton Mollen, John Hogrogian, Judah Gribetz,
and Edith Spivak. Their availability provided significant detail and insight, but also
complicated the history with personal and perhaps one-sided recollections. Mollen
and Gribetz, both of whom served in the Law Department, questioned some of
Professor Nelson’s conclusions on a number of topics. They both thought that many
of the lawyers who came into the office through the political process performed well,
and that Professor Nelson’s description of that process understated the quality of the
hires. 39 Professor Nelson does not disagree that many of the hires were of high
quality, but he does make the larger point that such a political hiring process tends to
undermine the professionalism of the Department.40 Mollen and Gribetz also feel
that Professor Nelson slighted the difficulty and complexity of the work performed
by the Law Department following World War II, especially the revisions of
administrative and regulatory rules, including the modernization of the complex and
critically important zoning ordinance and building code.41
By far, the most controversy occasioned by Fighting for the City concerned
Professor Nelson’s discussion of the Law Department’s support of the city’s removal
of Communists from municipal employment. Professor Nelson saw these events as
similar to earlier politically motivated efforts by the Law Department to advance
issues popular with a majority of voters. He cites, as earlier examples of politically
motivated policies, the obstruction of Prohibition, challenges to utility rate
adjustments, and the Bertrand Russell matter. Professor Nelson denounces such uses
of the resources of the Law Department as “legal demagoguery” of a type that
“remains familiar in American politics today.”42 Prior to the middle of the twentieth
36. Id.
37.

Id. at 183–218.

38. Id. at 189.
39.

Milton Mollen & Judah Gribetz, Remarks at the New York Law School Law Review Symposium: The
History of the New York City Law Department (Feb. 6, 2008).

40. William E. Nelson, Remarks at the New York Law School Law Review Symposium: The History of the

New York City Law Department (Feb. 6, 2008).
41.

Mollen & Gribetz, supra note 39.

42.

Nelson, supra note 2, at 196.
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century, he writes, most socio-economic and cultural conflicts had been resolved
mainly by elected officials, not lawyers:
Tammany’s purge of Communists from city government marked one of the
first sustained occasions in American history on which political leaders
relinquished control over a divisive issue and turned to government lawyers to
realize a cultural agenda. Sadly the lawyers, in thrall to a majoritarian
democratic ethos and hence oblivious to their obligation to comply with laws
adopted by government for the defense of all citizens, did the majority’s
bidding.43

The majority of voters to which Professor Nelson refers were Catholic voters in
New York City for whom anti-Communism was an important and highly emotional
issue. Professor Nelson builds his case by pointing out that, of the seven men who
held the position of Corporation Counsel in the twenty years following World War
II, five had Fordham law degrees and a sixth had a Fordham undergraduate degree.44
He also describes at length the international events that helped trigger concern
among New York City’s Catholic voters, particularly the arrests of Aloysius Stepinac,
the Archbishop of Zagreb, and the arrest of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, the
patriarch of Hungary.45 Judge Paul Crotty’s letter in this issue of the Law Review
responds to Professor Nelson’s assertions about the Catholic Church and its influence
on New York City voters.46 Professor Nelson, in turn, has amplified his views in
response.47
I would suggest that there were additional forces at work besides responding to
Catholic voters. Lawyers elsewhere, both in and out of government, were in the
process of establishing in the United States an entirely new legal culture that would
shortly bring into the nation’s courtrooms socio-economic issues similar to those that
the Law Department found itself engaged in. Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund were, most prominently, litigating through the federal courts
the issue of segregation—a fundamental social claim demanded by a large number of
citizens. The Supreme Court in its 1954 Brown v. Board of Education opinion48 not
only declared segregation unconstitutional; it sent a signal that the courts were ready
to become deeply involved in such issues. Lawyers everywhere began to bring an
avalanche of socio-economic and environmental claims to the courts. Following the
lead of the Supreme Court, federal and state judges moved into an era where the
judiciary accepted for judicial determination such issues as conditions in prisons and
43.

Id.

44. Fordham University is a Jesuit University located in Manhattan. See Fordham University, http://www.

fordham.edu (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
45.

Nelson, supra note 2, at 198–99.

46. See Crotty, supra note 1.
47.

See William E. Nelson, Defending the Historian’s Art: A Response to Paul A. Crotty’s Attack on Fighting for
the City, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 533 (2009).

48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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mental institutions, housing standards for homeless people, and procedural and
substantive rights of those on welfare.
Professor Nelson accurately sees such advocacy litigation when pursed by the
Law Department as an adjunct to election politics, describing it as an “alternate
method of governing, [by] currying popular favor by using Corporation Counsel to
bring litigation or otherwise take legal positions popular with major groups of
voters.”49 It may seem excessive to fault the Law Department of that era when
lawyers today of all political persuasions routinely bring every conceivable socioeconomic claim to the courts on behalf of both large and small groups. The Law
Department itself has recently brought affirmative claims that are popular with New
York City voters. These claims include demands that Midwestern states stop sending
their pollution to the East,50 that gun shops in the South stop selling Saturday night
specials,51 and that foreign countries with embassies in New York City stop defaulting
on their city taxes and fees.52
Professor Nelson’s purpose in developing the facts concerning the Catholic
Church and the wishes of New York City voters, however, was not a commentary on
the legal profession or the Catholic Church, but an example, in Professor Nelson’s
view, of the Law Department’s misunderstanding of its mission. Popular litigation,
even when unsuccessful, may help succeed at the ballots, but may ultimately be at
odds with the economic reality demanding a conservation of resources, not an
expansion of popular rights. Post-World War II New York City no longer commanded
monopoly resources. Popular litigation, even when successful, could neither supply
sufficient funds nor restore the level of support that the federal government had
provided the city during the Depression. “The Law Department that William
Whitney had created and that his politically motivated successors had made into an
effective tool of party government,” Professor Nelson writes, “had come to the end of
the line.”53 The final chapter of this era of declining resources fell to the administration
of John V. Lindsay who became mayor on January 1, 1966.54
Mayor Lindsay’s two Corporation Counsels, J. Lee Rankin and Norman Redlich,
were superb lawyers who restored non-political hiring to the Law Department,
created an honors program, and recruited top law school graduates, many of whom
remain at the Law Department in senior positions to this day.
Lindsay came into office with the goals of ending discrimination, broadening
and making fairer the city’s social programs, and engaging the federal government in
49. Nelson, supra note 2, at 216.
50. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Press Release,

N.Y. City Law Dep’t, New York City Files Suit Challenging the EPA’s Clean Air Act Rules (Mar. 3,
2003), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/pr030303.pdf.
51.
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(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2008).
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solving the growing problems of urban America. He relied heavily on his Corporation
Counsels and the Law Department to advance his political agenda. Professor Nelson
writes:
Thus Lindsay’s lawyers were advocates for an ideological agenda, not for the
city as a whole. Their advocacy reflected a new and noble conception of the
role of the Law Department as defender of equality and individualism . . . .
Unfortunately, however, a majority of New Yorkers were not committed either
to truly full equality or to genuinely individualistic values.55

Even more to the point, the economy of the city was in steep decline, ultimately
culminating in the fiscal crisis of 1975 during the mayoralty of Abraham D.
Beame.
The Law Department under Mayor Beame fell to 300 attorneys, half the number
of attorneys needed to handle the city’s workload. The Law Department, like the
city, was at sea for lack of resources. People left the Law Department and were not
replaced. Bernard Richland, Mayor Beame’s second Corporation Counsel, wrote of
the doleful and inadequate conditions of the Law Department in his transition brief,
dated November 1, 1977, for the incoming Koch administration.56 Richland cited
the inadequate number of attorneys, a failure to staff important cases, low salaries, a
high rate of attrition of attorneys, a failure to hire replacements, cramped and stifling
working conditions in the Municipal Building, and lack of storage space.57 The Law
Department plainly needed new leadership. This it got with the inauguration of
Mayor Edward I. Koch on January 1, 1978 and the appointment of Allen G. Schwartz
as Corporation Counsel.58
Allen G. Schwartz, to whom Fighting for the City is dedicated, took all of the
challenges listed by Richland, his predecessor, and, with Mayor Koch, solved them.
He did this by rebuilding a professional Law Department that saw as its client the
well-being of the city’s people. It is hard to overstate the magnitude of reforms that
Schwartz brought to the Law Department. He ended part-time private practices by
Law Department attorneys. He ended civil service hiring in favor of strict merit
hiring. He attracted to the office young stars from the best law schools. He moved
the entire staff to a modern office building, installed each attorney in a private office,
and provided adequate office support. He secured a budget increase that permitted
the hiring of 116 additional attorneys. He promoted younger, talented attorneys.
He inspired excellent work. He stayed out of politics and out of the press.59
As effective as Allen Schwartz surely was, the story begins with Mayor Koch
who, as he writes in this issue, knew that the success of a Koch administration
55.

Id. at 239–40.

56. W. Bernard Richland, Mayoral Transition Materials (Nov. 1, 1977), in A History of the New York

City Law Department tab 10 (Center for New York City Law & New York Law School Law Review
eds., 2007) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
57.
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58. Nelson, supra note 2, at 250, 252.
59.
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depended on a strong Corporation Counsel and Law Department that could defend
the city against the many groups who were, in his view, selfishly seeking to enlarge
their share of the municipal pie at the expense of the greater city.60 Mayor Koch
selected Allen Schwartz, his former law partner and close friend, and then backed
him with resources, deference, and independence. Professor Nelson and others agree
that the key ingredient that made Schwarz’s reforms possible was the governing style
of Mayor Koch. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. and Peter Zimroth, Mayor Koch’s
other two Corporation Counsels, confirm in their articles in this issue of the Law
Review Mayor Koch’s capacity to separate his political life from the legal needs of
the city.61 Two incidents from Professor Nelson’s book reflect just how much of the
Law Department’s independence reflected the rare style of governmental decisionmaking permitted by Mayor Koch.
In 1986 the city filed a brief in the United States Supreme Court supporting the
imposition of civil sanctions on a private construction union that had failed to meet
affirmative action quotas ordered by an earlier court order.62 Mayor Koch adamantly
opposed hiring quotas but, after much discussion, allowed Corporation Counsel
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. to file a brief in the Supreme Court on behalf of the
city that supported quotas and sanctions for failing to meet them, but also included
the novel statement that, while the city supported the court-ordered quotas, Mayor
Koch personally did not.63
As another example, the city lost a claim at trial that the city’s housing code
applied to Covenant House, a facility for homeless youth run by the Catholic
Church.64 The city wished to appeal. Mayor Koch was a close friend of John
Cardinal O’Connor, who was also an important political supporter. In addition, the
Catholic vote was one of Mayor’s Koch’s most dependable voting blocs. The legal
issue in the housing code case was close and could have gone either way. When the
Law Department brought the question to city hall of whether to appeal, Mayor
Koch, after hearing the issue, instructed Corporation Counsel Peter Zimroth to take
whatever position he believed to be correct. Zimroth was astonished at the
independence that he was given on a matter that so immediately impinged on the
Mayor’s personal and political interests.65
Professor Nelson summarized the philosophy that Schwartz and Koch brought
to the Law Department as having three characteristics.66 These three elements
60. See Edward I. Koch, Reflections on the New York City Law Department, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 369, 370
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remain today as benchmarks against which to measure the Law Department as well
as other governmental law offices.
First, hiring and promotion must be on the basis of merit.
Second, the Law Department must act as a lawyer zealously representing its
client, the city of New York, in the same manner in which a law firm represents a
business entity. By adhering to this standard, the Law Department can withstand
the various demands pressed by other officials or the public when those demands are
not in the interest of the corporate client.
Third, there must be an independence of judgment sufficient to permit the Law
Department to reach sound conclusions and offer useful advice to its client.
Behind these policies was Allen Schwartz and Mayor Koch’s accurate vision of
the needs of the city at the end of the twentieth century. Professor Nelson summarizes
that vision:
From LaGuardia to Lindsay, in short, New York politics was about ethnicity,
and [the] Corporation Counsel was a major participant in the ethnic conflicts
that politics generated. Allen Schwartz put an end to the old politics in the
Law Department. He brought an unselfconscious perspective of a
microeconomist to his office: he understood his task to be increasing the size
of the city’s economic pie, not worrying about what share different groups
should get or what power they should have to affect its distribution. Schwartz
understood his client to be a business, not a polity, and he understood his
duty was fiscal responsibility. He had returned, that is, to an eighteenthcentury understanding of the function of the Counsel to the Corporation of
the City of New York: in a world of municipal competition for business and
jobs, his responsibility was to assist his client to do the best it could in the
competitive race and to use his professional skills to facilitate and monitor
that client’s growth.67

* * * * *
The reforms of Allen Schwartz survived through the administrations of Mayors
David N. Dinkins, Rudolph W. Giuliani, and Michael R. Bloomberg, although not
perfectly.68
Hiring remains on the merits. The Law Department has continued to conduct a
hiring process that involves a formal application process, fall interviews and visits to
prestigious national law schools and local law schools, and an internal interviewing
and “weeding-out” process that is designed to produce the best possible candidates.
Nonetheless, Peter Sherwood, who served as Mayor Dinkins’s Corporation Counsel
for his last two years, stated at the Law Review symposium on the Law Department
that, on his appointment in 1992, he found an office with few African Americans,

67.
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and a hiring program that was not producing acceptable black candidates.69 He
instituted renewed efforts at recruiting African Americans, stating that the absence
of African Americans at the Law Department not only deprived the Department of
the richness of diversity, but had a more subtle effect: many alumni of the Law
Department left to become high level administrators in government, positions of
power which they might not have earned without their initial work at the Law
Department. Sherwood insisted that this loss of career opportunity for African
Americans was a hidden result of the failure to hire African Americans at the Law
Department.70
Sherwood’s comments could equally have been addressed to the nation’s law
schools, which have failed to attract and graduate a proportionate number of African
American attorneys, as was pointed out by Eric Lane at the symposium.71 The Law
Department continues to encourage diversity, reporting in 2006 that eighteen percent
of its attorneys were black, Hispanic, or Asian.72 The policy of seeking a diverse
workforce is consistent with a merit-hiring policy, but might still be criticized as
reflecting a philosophy similar to that adopted by Tammany Hall when it supported
patronage hiring because of its belief that law and policies should be developed and
enforced by people from the community, and that those attorneys would thereby gain
social stature and power in the performance of those duties. There is a tremendous
difference, however, between hiring on a patronage basis exclusively, as indulged in
by Tammany Hall, and hiring on a merit basis that engrafts an element to support
diversity within a merit program.
Representation of the city as an economic entity remains a central tenet of the
Law Department. In this, the Department has been supported by mayors who have
for the most part followed economic and political policies similar to those established
by Mayor Koch. Each of the succeeding administrations faced its own severe budget
shortfall, which no doubt produced a painful incentive to prevent departures from
sound fiscal policies. Nonetheless, these policies were not always followed.
For example, Mayor Dinkins reversed a Law Department litigation position
opposing the granting of city health benefits to the partners of gay and lesbian city
workers. The city council refused to pass such benefits because it could not agree on
how to provide similar benefits to the partners of heterosexual city workers. Mayor
Dinkins, frustrated by the council and seeking to win gay and lesbian votes during
his close re-election campaign in 1993, directed the Law Department to reverse the
city’s litigation position; he had the Law Department consent to a court order that
provided the benefits. In this way Dinkins sought to advance his election prospects
69. Peter Sherwood, Address at the New York Law School Law Review Symposium: The History of the
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by using the Law Department to grant costly rights rather than having the rights
litigated or provided through the competitive budget and legislative process.73
By contrast, the Giuliani administration’s 1996 refusal to consent to a court order
on the management of the city’s foster care system shows the advantage of taking a
litigation position protective of the city. In the wake of several children’s deaths,
advocates of children’s rights asked the federal court to take over the city’s foster care
system. The city refused to consent, declaring it would reform the child welfare
system on its own. It argued that management by the court would be disastrously
costly, would produce worse results for the children, and would ultimately be
unsuccessful. The Law Department’s tough negotiation position, plus its willingness
to go to trial, forced the plaintiffs to agree to allow the city to manage its own
program. When, three years later, the city’s successful reform of the foster care
system was certified by the court’s outside monitors, the judge terminated the case in
its entirety.74
The city has not been so successful with other consent decrees. It finds itself still
battling plaintiffs over such public programs as prison conditions, special education,
and services for homeless families.75 It falls to the Law Department to draw the line
between providing what is legally required, while still defending the fiscal soundness
of the city. It is here that Professor Nelson’s analytical framework is most helpful.
Each of the plaintiff groups can, and do, make powerful arguments on behalf of
their interests. The Law Department, by adhering to a standard that looks to the
welfare of the entire city, can develop independent and reasonable positions
responding to the various claims. In some situations, a consent decree providing
additional resources is appropriate; in other cases it is not. A Law Department that
adheres to the interests of its primary client can best develop a professional and fair
legal response.
Demands for increased services have not been the only democratic challenges
faced by the Law Department. Following the 1990 charter revision, the Law
Department was drawn into litigation that pitted the mayor against other elected
officials. Prior to the 1990 charter changes, the Board of Estimate was the city’s
major political forum. The Board of Estimate controlled land use, contracts,
franchises, and the budget. The voting members were the mayor, city council
president, comptroller, and the five borough presidents. Following the Supreme
Court’s decision declaring that the voting scheme of the Board of Estimate violated
the one-person, one-vote rule,76 a charter revision commission opted to abolish the
Board of Estimate. In doing so, the new charter weakened the city council president,
73. See Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree 169–70 (2003).
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the comptroller, and the five borough presidents, enhanced the already great powers
of the mayor, and significantly enlarged and strengthened the city council. Powers
that had once resided exclusively with the Board of Estimate were redistributed.
Sorting out the new power realignments after 1990 generated significant amounts of
litigation. It also required the Law Department under Victor Kovner, Mayor
Dinkins’ first Corporation Counsel, to write a complicated and lengthy opinion
setting out various agency powers under the new charter. That opinion remains the
governing authority for the city.
The Law Department represents all of the competing officials. As a result,
when the officials sue each other seeking to obtain favorable rulings about charter
powers, it complicates the issue of the Law Department’s client. Such litigations
have involved some of the most basic issues of local governance. The council and
mayor have litigated the authority of the mayor to sell a public hospital,77 the authority
of the council to modify the budget,78 the power of the council to establish a police
review board,79 and the authority of the council to pass a living wage bill for employees
of private businesses contracting with the city.80 The public advocate challenged the
Mayor’s refusal to provide him information on police discipline.81 The comptroller
litigated the mayor’s authority to change the ownership of upstate reservoir lands82
and the mayor’s power to register contracts allegedly tainted by violation of the city’s
procurement rules.83
When the mayor has been challenged by a fellow elected official, the Law
Department has represented the mayor’s position, opting to permit the opposing
elected official to hire his or her own lawyer. Such cases do not easily fit within the
conceptual scheme set out by Professor Nelson since it is not obvious which official’s
position most clearly supports the economic well-being of the city. Perhaps more to
the point, these instances testify more to the need for a professional and competent
Law Department, which can advise the mayor in ways that avoid unnecessary
litigation between elected officials.
What is most remarkable is that the independence and professionalism established
during the Koch administration have remained a hallmark of the Law Department.
The culture established by Allen Schwartz has continued, guarded by the succeeding
Corporation Counsels and by the cadre of long-time Law Department attorneys who
came into maturity with that culture of independence and professionalism.
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Michael Cardozo, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg’s Corporation Counsel, has
been dogged in his determination to maintain the professionalism and independence
of the Law Department. During his tenure, the Law Department enforced fines
against a striking transit union, 84 defended a court decision not to allow gay
marriage,85 and successfully lobbied for legislation that reduced damage awards
against the city for slip and falls on public sidewalks.86 It was Cardozo who
commissioned Professor Nelson to write a history of the Law Department as a way
to reinforce and sustain the culture of professionalism and independence.
Professor Nelson, as he concludes his book, questions just how strong that culture
is, citing the Giuliani administration’s attempt to revoke the lease of the Brooklyn
Museum following an exhibition which Mayor Giuliani deemed to be anti-Catholic
and in violation of the city’s lease with the museum trustees. Mayor Giuliani’s
second Corporation Counsel, Michael Hess, defended the action and ultimately
negotiated a settlement.87
In Professor Nelson’s view, the Brooklyn Museum case represented the use of the
Law Department to advance the mayor’s personal political agenda rather than the
city’s interests.88 He concluded that reforms brought to life by Allen Schwartz and
Ed Koch remain tentative and incomplete, dependent on the policies of the mayor
and the mayor’s acceptance of an independent and professional Law Department.
This conclusion seems itself tentative and cautious. What Professor Nelson’s Fighting
for the City has shown is that it is possible to have a professional and independent
Law Department and, even more importantly, how to define those qualities. For
this reason alone, his book should remain required reading for all future Law
Department attorneys, in particular the future Corporation Counsels, for the mayors
who will appoint them, and for all students of city government who love and want to
know our city.
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